**AVIATION TRAVEL SECURITY BRIEF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRPORT NAME</th>
<th>Misrata International Airport</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIRPORT IDENTIFIER</td>
<td>ICAO: HLMS IATA: MRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRPORT LOCATION</td>
<td>Misrata, Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE REVIEWED</td>
<td>23 March 2020</td>
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**CITY RISK RATING**

- **MEDICAL RATING**: EXTREME
- **COUNTRY RATING**: EXTREME
- **LOCAL EMERGENCY**: N/A

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**Security Personnel**

- Security personnel and militias are often synonymous and ineffective.

**Security Features**

- Minimal security technology in use; poorly maintained perimeter fencing surrounds the installation.

**Runway Specs.**

- **15/33**: 11,152 x 148 ft. (3,400 x 45 m.) @ elevation 38 ft. (12 m.) ASL

**Ground Handling**

- Slots and handling not required; ground handling providers available.

**Airport of Entry**

- Yes.

**International Standard**

- Does not manage according to international standards

**Hours of Ops**

- 24/7

**Airport Contacts**

- Airport Authority: +218 21 563 0219
- ATS: +218 21 563 2338

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AVIATION SUMMARY

Libya remains a difficult environment for aviation operators. As such, **all operations to Libya should be deferred, and operators should not enter the Tripoli FIR**. Any operator who does not wish to adhere to this advice should carefully plan any movement into the country in conjunction with a reputable in-country security provider. Even if there are no intentions of overnighting in Libya, all operators should make contact with a security provider in advance in the event the aircraft is unable to takeoff and the crew is forced to remain overnight.

**Our advice remains that all travel and aviation operations to Libya should be deferred. The security environment remains unstable and fluid with ongoing conflict between several factions throughout the country. The situation is further constrained by the high-level of militancy and Islamist extremism throughout the country. There is substantial risk to aviation operations at all flight levels due to SAM and AAA systems that have been used in the country; we maintain an airspace assessment that discusses these threats in detail. We do not anticipate an improvement in the security environment in the near or mid-term.**

Please consult our Airspace Assessment of Libya for additional information on aviation risk in the country.

AIRPORT SUMMARY

Misrata International Airport is a small facility located approximately 6 miles (10 km) north of Misrata city centre. The airport is dual civilian and military-use facility that the UN-backed government in Tripoli uses for military aviation operations. The airport is serviced by both domestic and international carriers, as well cargo companies. Services and amenities at the airport are basic with only one ground handler available. Unlike other airports in the country the facility has not sustained serious damage to its infrastructure and the runway shows signs continual maintenance through imagery analysis.

AIRPORT SECURITY

Security standards are variable, especially in relation to the local EXTREME-risk environment. The airport is surrounded by a perimeter fence but population encroachment on all sides of the installation is significant and increases the risk of airfield incursions. The use of technology to monitor the airport grounds is minimal and not well-implemented. Security personnel and militias are often synonymous, and are often corrupt and/or poorly trained while lacking appropriate equipment. Generally the presence of armed personnel adds another layer of security, though in this case it is unlikely they will take any responsibility or direct action to protect aircraft parked on the ground and may be more of a threat than benefit. Security standards should not be considered adequate to support safe and reliable aviation operations.

The ongoing conflict between the UN recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has added another dimension to the security environment of Misrata Airport. Throughout Haftar’s ongoing offensive on Tripoli, Misrata has been consistently used as a divert for flights into Mitiga Airport, Tripoli’s only functional airport, when the airport was closed due to damage or attack. Despite this, we do not assess Misrata to be a secure airport for operations. The airport and city are controlled by GNA forces, and Turkish military retains personnel and equipment there as well. The airport has been targeted on several notable occasions:

- **3 November, 30 October 2019:** LNA carries out airstrikes against the Misrata Air College, adjacent to Misrata Airport.
- **5 October 2019:** A drone strike targeted Misrata Airport, wounding one, damaging two light towers, and suspending flights. The strike was believed to have been carried out with Chinese made Wing Loon drones provided to the LNA by the UAE.
- **13 September 2019:** An airstrike by LNA forces led to a temporary suspension of operations at Misrata.
- **19 August 2019:** GNA forces claim to shoot down a UAE drone operating over Misrata.
As for Misrata city, there have been several airstrikes reported in November. In particular, on 19 November, the LNA reportedly launched airstrikes targeting armoured vehicles and an ammunition depot. The airstrikes ostensibly struck residential areas in the city centre instead. At least 13 people were injured in the incident. Turkish forces operating in the city in support of the GNA offer an attractive potential target for LNA forces. On 1 November, an unidentified armed group also carried out an attack on Qasr Ahmad Police department in Misrata City. No casualties were reported.

**TRAVEL SECURITY—MISRATA**

Overall, Libya, to include Misrata, is still rated as an EXTREME travel security risk environment due to the ongoing fight between forces in support of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and those loyal to the Libyan National Army (LNA). This means all travel should be deferred and avoided.

Fighting continues around Tripoli between the opposed groups and in the environs around the city, including Misrata. Aforementioned, Mitiga International Airport (MJI) remains non-operational as of now, despite the official announcement of its gradual reopening. The presence of Islamist extremist militant groups also poses a risk to operations in-country. In addition to the ongoing conflicts, civil unrest is another issue that can take place in Libya, particularly in the capital, Tripoli.

Numerous countries and the United Nations Security Council continue to call for a ceasefire as violence continues to rage. The US on 24 November had officials meet with the head of the LNA, Khalifa Hafter, to deliberate the possibility of a political resolution to the Libyan conflict. Nonetheless, a de-escalation in the level of fighting in the country seems to be a remote possibility as the LNA has pushed back against peace processes initiated by the UN before; continued airstrikes and on-the-ground fighting conducted by both parties also underscores the likelihood of a protracted engagement. There are also reports that indicate foreign actors are involved in backing both the GNA and LNA with fighters and weaponry reinforcing the likelihood of the violence continuing. With the reopening of Mitiga International Airport in the upcoming days, it is currently unknown whether the alleged use of the site by the GNA for military purposes will continue. If so, it will likely again be targeted by LNA forces for further attacks.

**STANDING TRAVEL ADVICE**

- Defer all travel to Libya, including the capital Tripoli and Misrata city (Misrata district), amid protracted armed conflict in and around the capital that poses significant incidental risks to civilians.
- Staff currently in Libya should depart.

**LODGING**

As a best practice measure all travel should be conducted with the support of a 24/7 private security provider. Security providers should have access to armoured vehicles, armed protection teams, operations room tracking, reliable backup communications and locally sourced threat intelligence. This will offer the highest level of protection against being either directly targeted or indirectly affected by the threats previously mentioned. All movement outside secure compounds should be made in liaison with your security provider to allow for the latest information to inform convoy procedures, route selection and convoy profile.

Similarly accommodation should be selected within a secure compound or villa which has enhanced outer perimeter security blast walls and anti-intrusion measures, there should be a 24/7 armed security presence on site who conduct vehicle and personnel checks before entry is permitted. The accommodation building should have sufficient standoff from the perimeter to provide blast mitigation and hard cover with overhead protection should be available to mitigate indirect fire or mortar attacks.
EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE

Almost all healthcare services are non-functional due to conflict and there is no reliable access to quality medical care. Even the major hospitals may not be able to provide basic services. There are shortages of medicines and other essential supplies. In any event, we strongly advise immediately contacting MedAire’s 24/7 Global Response Center for advice and coordination of care should a medical emergency arise.

ENTRY & EXIT REQUIREMENTS

Entry and exit requirements constantly change and depend on individual circumstances, such as; nationality, point of origin, and destination. Please submit individual requirements to the here database for specific up to date information.

VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS

For the most up-to-date vaccination requirements and recommendations, please visit the MedAire Client Portal (login required) or contact MedLink directly to discuss your specific requirements and recommendations with a medical professional.

Emergency Contact Information:

MedAire Assistance 24/7: +1 602-281-3330